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BRIAN DAVIES 
THE ROAD TO PEREIASLAV
Ukrainian and Muscovite Understandings of Protectorate, 
1620-1654
At a rada held at Pereiaslav in January 1654 Bohdan Khmel´nyts´kyi and the cossack 
starshyna placed the Hetmanate under the protection of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich. 
Their intentions in so doing, the intentions of Tsar Aleksei in accepting, and the 
political consequences for Ukraine of taking on protectorate status have continued 
to generate sharp controversy among Ukrainian and Russian historians. Even the 
question of whether the 350th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Agreement should be 
celebrated or mourned sparked widespread public debate in Ukraine in 2004.1 
The following attempt to reconstruct the events leading to the 1654 Pereiaslav 
negotiations was prepared in the course of writing a monograph examining 
Muscovite military development in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is 
concerned solely with trying to understand the shifting strategic calculations that 
finally led to the negotiations at Pereiaslav and it has no interest in weighing in 
on questions of the historical injustice or justice of the Pereiaslav union. Rather it 
argues that discourse about the historical religious-political kinship of Ukrainians 
and Muscovites and the original unity of Rus´ had much less influence upon efforts 
to negotiate the tsar’s protectorate than did military considerations; that Moscow 
was unprepared to acknowledge protector “responsibility” until quite late — the 
summer of 1653 — and then changed its position largely because it now saw 
alliance with the Hetmanate as assisting other strategic projects of higher priority 
than vassalizing Ukraine; and that neither side came to Pereiaslav with a firm and 
concrete idea as to how protectorate would redefine the respective sovereignties of 
Muscovy and the Hetmanate. 
1. Zenon Kohut, “Facing Ukraine’s Russian Legacy: Politics and History in the Late Kuchma 
Era,” Harriman Review, 15, 2-3 (May 2005): 19-24; Stephen Velychenko, “1654 and All That 
in 2004,” Journal of Ukrainian Studies 30, 1 (Summer 2005): 97-122.
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Early discourse on Ukrainian-Muscovite affinity
Of all the interpretations offered in the past to explain the 1654 Pereiaslav agreement, 
the CPSU Central Committee’s 1954 Theses about Pereiaslav as the culmination 
of a natural and inevitable process of “reunifying” the Ukrainian and Russian 
Orthodox Rus peoples appear today the least convincing when we observe how 
insubstantial discourse about such a project had been before the Khmel´nyts´kyi 
Revolt.2
Serhii Plokhy’s recent study of the confessionalization of the Ukrainian Orthodox 
church and its impact on Ukrainian political thought takes note of the “unity of 
Rus´” rhetoric coming out of the L´viv Brotherhood and the scholars around Prince 
Kostiantyn Ostrozky in the 1590s, for example, but finds no sign it had any impact 
on Muscovite religious and political circles and comes to the same conclusion 
reached by Edward L. Keenan, that “there are hardly sufficient grounds to posit 
the existence of any program of ‘reunification’ in sixteenth-century Muscovy.”3 In 
the 1620s growing alarm about the Polish Crown’s support of the Uniate Church 
and marginalization of the Orthodox Church provoked Bishop Isaia Kopyn´skyi 
and Metropolitan Iov Borets´kyi to elaborate upon the themes struck by the L´viv 
brethren in letters (1622, 1624) sent to the Moscow patriarch and the tsar; these 
letters spoke of the natural brotherhood of the Little and Great Rus´ peoples and 
asked the latter to take thought of their suffering younger brethren as Joseph showed 
generosity to Benjamin. Borets´kyi’s letter even accepted that the new Romanov 
dynasty descended from the Riurikids and thereby from Vladimir and the princes 
of Kiev.4 But the notion that the historical kinship of Ukrainian-Muscovite Rus´ 
justified and necessitated not only the tsar’s assistance to the Orthodox Church 
in Ukraine but Ukrainian abandonment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
and political union with Muscovy as yet had no deep roots in Ukrainian culture. It 
would take another three decades of propaganda work by the bishops and especially 
further church and cossack estrangement from Polish rule before it would be 
seriously entertained by a large part of Ukrainian society. 
Getting the Muscovite tsar and patriarch to recognize their obligations to protect 
the Ukrainian Orthodox people also required a long struggle, for the Muscovite 
Orthodox Church after the Troubles was inclined towards “self-isolation, suspicion, 
and vigilance towards the surrounding world” and reluctant to recognize that 
Ukrainian subjects of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth could be true Orthodox 
at all (for this reason the rebaptism of Ukrainian immigrants was often insisted 
2. Tezisy o 300-letii vossoedineniia Ukrainy s Rossiei, 1654-1954 gg. [Theses regarding the 
300th aniversary of the reuniting of Ukraine and Russia, 1654-1954] (M.: Gospolitizdat, 1954). 
For a summary and examination of how the 1954 Theses enforced an official historiographic 
line for nearly thirty years, see John Basarab, Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study 
(Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1982), 179-187. 
3. Serhii Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion in Early Modern Ukraine (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 285-287. 
4. Ibid., 288-290.
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upon). In Muscovite discourse in the 1630s Ukrainians were still Litovtsy or Liakhy 
[Lithuanians, Poles], or Cherkasy if they were cossacks, but they were not yet 
considered russkie [Russians] despite the efforts of some Ukrainian churchmen to 
promote Muscovite acceptance of the terms Little Rus´ and Great Rus´ as expressions 
of shared ethnopolitical and religious heritage.5
Furthermore, rapprochement with the Zaporozhian Host was discouraged by 
recent memories of the humiliations Muscovy had suffered at Ukrainian cossack 
hands during the Troubles and during the Smolensk War. As evidence that the Host 
was already interested in negotiating the tsar’s protectorate some have pointed to 
Zaporozhian Hetman Petr Konashevich Sahaidachnyi’s decision in 1620 to notify 
Moscow the Host “want to serve him, the Grand Sovereign, with their heads [their 
lives], as before, as they served previous Great Russian sovereigns” and to seek 
the tsar’s blessing for a campaign against the Crimean Tatars, which the Polish 
king was forbidding them to do. “In spring we will all go to Zaporozh´ia and all 
petition the Grand Sovereign, that the Sovereign would show bounty to us as his 
bondsmen (chtob nas gosudar´ pozhaloval kak svoikh kholopei).” But it is more 
likely Sahaidachnyi was attempting a temporary tactical rapprochement with 
Moscow in order to alarm King Zygmunt III and press him to expand the cossack 
register and permit raids on the Tatars. It was unlikely that this overture would be 
entertained seriously by the tsar, given the great damage Sahaidachnyi’s cossacks 
had inflicted on Muscovite towns and villages in their raids of 1618-1619. The tsar 
sent Sahaidachnyi a token gift of three hundred rubles but refused to approve an 
attack on the Crimean Tatars.6 
Muscovite suspicion of Ukrainians continued to be displayed in its policy on 
the resettlement of “cherkas” refugees. In 1638 Hetman Iatsko Ostrianyn defected 
to Muscovy with an entire polk of about a thousand men and was given permission 
by the tsar to found his own fortified settlement at Chuguev on the Donets River. 
Its relations with neighboring Muscovite garrisons and their voevody soon became 
strained, however, and the Chuguev colony broke up in 1652 when Ostrianyn’s 
regiment, angered at harassment at the hands of Muscovite officials and swayed 
by Polish propaganda, mutinied against him and returned to Ukraine. Hence the 
Military Chancellery preferred to resettle immigrant Ukrainian cossacks as corps 
cossacks or ranger atamans serving alongside Muscovite servicemen in the garrison 
towns of the emerging Belgorod Line. It also permitted settlement at Belgorod Line 
towns to small numbers of Ukrainian townsmen and peasants who had skills as 
millers, distillers, smiths, or saltpetre-makers, for which they were usually awarded 
privileges of duty-free trade. But the Military Chancellery tried to channel most 
5. Ibid., 291, 293, 296, 297.
6. S.M. Solov´ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen [History of Russia from the Earliest 
Times], kn. 5, t. 10 (M.: Izd. Sotsial´no-politicheskoi literatury, 1961), 441; Petro Sas, “Diplo-
matichna misiia Viis´ka Zaporozh´kogo do Moskvi u 1620 r.” [The diplomatic mission of the 
Zaporozhian Host to Moscow in 1620], in V.A. Smolii, V.M. Gorobets´, et al., eds., Ukraina 
ta Rosiia: Problemi politichnikh i sotsiokul´turnikh vidnosin [Ukraine and Russia: problems of 
political and socio-cultural relations] (Kiev: Institut istorii Ukraini 2003), 26, 63-64.
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arrivals through one border station, Putivl´, for vetting and policing purposes, and 
to avoid concentrating too many Cherkas colonists too close to the Ukrainian border 
— it considered this a potential security problem — and resettled many of them 
farther east along the Line, at Korocha, Valuiki, Voronezh and even as far as Kozlov. 
In some Line districts where there were enough cherkasy, they were allowed to 
settle together in special suburban colonies (cherkasskie slobody) under their own 
elected atamans, but their atamans in turn had to answer to a special Muscovite syn 
boiarskii charged with keeping them under surveillance. The town governors and 
neighboring Muscovite servicemen often doubted the loyalty of Cherkas colonists 
and jailed them for insubordination or had them transferred to Kazan´ and other 
garrisons farther east. As of 1647 there were still only about 2,500 adult male 
Ukrainian refugees enrolled in service in fourteen districts of the Belgorod Line. 
Ukrainian migration into southern Muscovy and Sloboda Ukraine would not take off 
until Khmel´nyts´kyi’s revolt against the Commonwealth was well under way.7
The Khmel´nyts´kyi revolt and Muscovite strategic interests, 1648-1652
Appeals on the basis of religious and ethnic affinity were therefore not enough; 
convincing the tsar to intervene required that he be made to see real strategic gain 
from it and minimal risk. I.B. Cherkasskii and Ivan Gramotin may have seen some 
opportunity in it, but the government as a whole was preoccupied in the 1620s-
1630s with the mission of recovering Smolensk and Lithuanian west Rus´.
Even the outbreak of the Khmel´nyts´kyi Revolt and his early military successes 
against Polish forces did not change this thinking. Tsar Aleksei’s government still 
hoped to preserve the 1634 Polianovka Armistice with the Commonwealth and 
even build upon it to form an alliance with the Commonwealth against the Crimean 
Tatars (as Adam Kysil was proposing, in order to press the khan into abandoning 
Khmel´nyts´kyi); it viewed the recent passing of Władysław IV (May 1648) as 
an opportunity to achieve such an alliance and perhaps even the election of Tsar 
Aleksei to the Polish throne. Meanwhile Khmel´nyts´kyi’s own alliance with the 
Crimean Tatars caused it great anxiety, for it raised the possibility the Tatars could 
raid Muscovite border towns from the territory of the new Hetmanate, circumventing 
the Belgorod Line. Moscow was further troubled by Khmel´nyts´kyi’s negotiations 
with Ottoman envoys over the possibility of placing the Hetmanate under the 
sultan’s protection, which at the least suggested Khmel´nyts´kyi was playing a 
double game and was not in earnest about alliance with Muscovy.
The record of Ukrainian-Muscovite diplomacy reveals why circumstances did 
not favor a Muscovite pledge of protectorate until the spring of 1653. 
In early 1649 Khmel´nyts´kyi made his first serious attempt to recruit the tsar 
as ally by sending Patriarch Paisios of Jerusalem and Col. Syluian Muzhylovsky 
7. Brian Davies, Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500-1700 (London, New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 101-102.
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to Moscow — Paisios to make the argument for honoring Orthodox religious 
solidarity, Muzhylovsky to propose that if the tsar invaded western Seversk he would 
“recover” this territory for Muscovy while protecting the new Hetmanate’s northern 
flank against the Lithuanians. But Moscow was not ready to accept this proposal. 
It considered it too risky to break armistice with the Commonwealth at this time, 
especially given that the cossack revolt might yet fail; and above all it remained 
uneasy about Khmel´nyts´kyi’s alliance with the Crimean Tatars and his new oath of 
fealty to the sultan. In the first months of his revolt Khmel´nyts´kyi had found Tatar 
support indispensable — not only for his military struggle against the Poles, but for 
his diplomacy, for reminding the Muscovites they risked future conflict with the 
Tatars and perhaps even the Turks if they failed to accept the alliance he proposed 
to them. But the events of summer 1649 cast doubt on Khmel´nyts´kyi’s ability to 
control his Tatar allies: the khan had accepted Polish bribes and lifted his siege of 
Zbarazh, which forced Khmel´nyts´kyi to accept an unfavorable armistice with the 
Poles (signed at Zboriv in mid-August), and Tatar chambuly had ceased raiding 
Polish-controlled territory and were now taking most of their human plunder from 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s Hetmanate. Khmel´nyts´kyi was not in the position to protest this 
lest his alliance with the Tatars collapse altogether. He still needed their assistance; 
Mykhailo Hrushev´skyi, History of Ukraine-Rus´. Volume Nine, Book Two, Part One. The 
Cossack Age, 1654-1657. Trans. Marta Skorupsky; edited Andrzej Poppe and Frank Sysyn, 
(Edmonton and Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2008), p. IV.
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the Zboriv Armistice was unpopular with his colonels and unlikely to last, and he 
still had to station Tatar detachments near some Ukrainian towns of questionable 
loyalty to the Hetmanate.8 
Under these circumstances it was not difficult for Moscow to imagine 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s dependency on the Tatars eventually pressuring him to join the 
khan in attacks on southern Muscovy or at least leaving him unable to stop such 
attacks. The khan and the sultan were already protesting Don Cossack raids on their 
territory as intolerable provocations, and in May 1650 an envoy from the sultan put 
Khmel´nyts´kyi on notice he was expected to deter such Don Cossack raids or even 
undertake retaliatory attack on the Don Host as the price for continued support from 
the Khanate and the Porte. Moscow had received report that Khmel´nits´kyi’s son 
Dem´ka was camping on the Mius´ River with five or six thousand men, awaiting 
Tatar reinforcements before attacking the Don Cossack settlement at Cherkassk. 
In reality Khmel´nyts´kyi was trying to avoid being held to this commitment. But 
Moscow still had reason to worry about the security of its southern frontier as long as 
large Tatar forces were operating in Ukraine, for Tatar attacks out of Ukraine could 
circumvent the Belgorod Line. There was intelligence from Crimea confirming that 
the khan and his mirzas recognized that they 
cannot in any way pass across the steppe with an army to attack the Sovereign’s 
Borderland towns, because a strong wall has been erected and deep ditches dug, 
and many towns have been built behind the wall and many troops established 
in the towns. But when the khan’s sons go with troops to Hetman Bogdan 
Khmel´nitskii, to aid him against the Poles […] [they] can attack the Sovereign’s 
Borderland towns from the Lithuanian side.9 
Although appearing to accept Adamy Kysil’s proposal that he join the Tatars in an 
attack upon Muscovite Seversk, Khmel´nyts´kyi had no desire for such a campaign 
and in April 1650 sent Samiilo Bohdanovich-Zarudny to Moscow to ask the tsar 
to continue taking a firm line against the Commonwealth “so that all the needs of 
Orthodox Christians on both sides of the border are met” and the Uniate Church 
dismantled in Ukraine. Bohdanovich-Zarudny declared:
Hetman Bohdan Khmel´nyts´kyi and all the Zaporozhian Host greatly desire to 
be united in alliance with Orthodox Christians [i.e., the Muscovites] […] And 
the hetman and the whole Zaporozhian Host have long contemplated that they 
8. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´. Volume Eight: The Cossack Age, 1626-
1650, trans. Marta Olynyk (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2002), 527, 
538, 556-557, 579-614; AJuZR, vol. 3, nos 195, 196, 224, 245, 256, 262.
9. A.A. Novosel´skii, “Bor´ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s tatarami vo vtoroi polovine XVII 
veka” [“The struggle of Muscovy against the Tatars during the second half of XVIIth century”], 
in N.N. Pokrovskii, E.K. Romodanovskaia, L.V. Titova, eds., Issledovaniia po istorii ėpokhi 
feodalizma [Historical research into the feodalism period] (M.: Nauka, 1994), 15; AJuZR 3, 
nos 282, 285, 305 ; G.G. Litavrin, ed., Osmanskaia imperiia i strany tsentral´noi, vostochnoi, i 
iugovostochnoi Evropy v XVII veke [The Ottoman Empire and the countries of Central, Eastern 
and Southwestern Europe in the XVIIth century] (M.: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2001), 
202-203, 206-207; Solov´ev, Istoriia Rossii, 553-554, 571.
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want to serve His Tsarist Majesty. Today, too, they maintain that they will do for 
His Tsarist Majesty whatever pleases him, the Sovereign.
Bohdanovich-Zarudny reportedly expressed the hope that “the hetman and the 
Zaporozhian Host would, for the sake of the Orthodox Christian faith, unanimously 
insist that they should be free from subjugation to the Liakh faith and bound in 
unity with the Orthodox Christians under the high hand of his Tsarist Majesty.” 
Bohdanovich-Zarudny explained that the hetman had signed peace with the king 
under duress and still feared the Poles. One should take note here of the vagueness 
of his appeal — which speaks of some kind of alliance and of “serving” the 
Sovereign, but not explicitly as subject — as well as of the fact that this wording 
is itself a paraphrase of Bohdanovich-Zarudny’s address by the secretaries of the 
Ambassador’s Chancellery. Bohdanovich-Zarudny evidently made little impression 
when weighed against intelligence about the Polish-Tatar rapprochement and reports 
that the Zaporozhian Host was harboring the Pretender Timofei Akundinov.10
Khmel´nyts´kyi therefore received the Ottoman envoy Osman Aga at Chyhyryn 
and declared his submission to the Porte (late July 1650). This did not preclude 
that he would renew negotiations with Moscow ; rather, it appears to have been a 
shorter-term maneuver to avoid having to accept alliance with the Poles and joining 
the Tatars against the Muscovites, for it was immediately followed by his military 
intervention in Moldavia. In order to provide reason to decline the Crimean khan’s 
request that he participate in an attack on Muscovy, Khmel´nyts´kyi now proposed 
instead a cossack-Tatar invasion of Moldavia. The initial objective of this invasion 
was to overthrow Hospodar Vasile Lupu and replace him with Moise Mohila, 
first cousin of Kiev Metropolitan Petro Mohila. When this no longer appeared 
achievable, the objective became forcing Lupu to affiance his daughter Roksanda to 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s son Tymysh. If this could be achieved it would not only establish 
the Khmel´nyts´kyis’ dynastic claim to the Moldavian throne but secure the 
Hetmanate’s western flank and put the Poles further on the defensive. It might even 
reduce the danger of a Lithuanian invasion of the Hetmanate by making Lithuanian 
Grand Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł, husband of Lupu’s eldest daughter Elena, brother-
in-law to Tymysh Khmel´nyts´kyi. The Moldavian project had the further utility of 
testing the Ottoman sultan’s willingness to offer further concessions in order to 
keep Khmel´nyts´kyi’s vassalage and rewards for abandoning alliance with Poland 
against the Porte and for leaving Vasile Lupu in power. In fact Sultan Mehmet IV 
soon bestowed these concessions despite his reluctance to see his vassal Lupu’s 
power challenged; in December 1650 he recognized Khmel´nyts´kyi as a vassal 
prince free of tribute obligations (though still bound to remain in friendship with the 
khanate and to send his army where the sultan commanded). At Istanbul Colonel 
Antin Zhdanovych received an imperial rescript declaring the Zaporozhian Host 
10. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´. Volume Nine, Book One: The Cossack 
Age, 1650-1653, trans. Bohdan Struminski (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian 
Studies, 2005), 36-41.
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would be taken under “the wing and protection of our Sublime Porte,” protected 
from Tatar raiding, and given military support against its enemies. The terms of 
the sultan’s protectorate, then, encouraged Khmel´nyts´kyi to expect considerable 
continuing independence for the Hetmanate as well as continuing Ottoman pressure 
on the Crimean khan to maintain good relations with him11. 
The sultan’s protectorate pledge never delivered meaningful military assistance 
however, and by rejecting the alliance proposed by Kysil and launching operations 
in Moldavia Khmel´nyts´kyi had given King Jan Kazimierz justification for 
resuming war against the Hetmanate. In autumn 1650 the king began preparing 
for a Polish invasion of Ruś Czerwona coordinated with a march upon Kiev by 
Lithuanian forces under Radziwiłł and strikes out of Moldavia by Lupu.
These events led Moscow to reexamine its policies and give greater attention 
to strengthening relations with the Hetmanate. In letters brought to Moscow by 
Metropolitan Gabriel of Nazareth and the Muscovite starets Arsenii Sukhanov 
in December 1650 Khmel´nyts´kyi again requested an alliance against the Poles. 
He pointed out that he had demonstrated the value of his friendship by rejecting 
alliance with the Commonwealth and redirecting the Tatars against Moldavia. He 
also implied that if the tsar failed to support the Hetmanate he might be forced to 
seek further protection from the sultan to the disadvantage of Muscovite interests 
in the region.12 
Khmel´nyts´kyi could take some encouragement from signs that Muscovite 
diplomacy towards the Commonwealth had grown more truculent in 1650. The tsar 
had now chosen to cast recent Polish breaches of protocol (omission of certain of 
his titles, the publication in some recent books of insults to his honor) as affronts 
so grave as to threaten the peace signed at Polianovka in 1634. He demanded a 
compensation of 500,000 zlotys and the execution of Wiśniowiecki and other 
slanderers of his honor. He even insisted now upon the return of Smolensk if peace 
was to be preserved. He threatened the king and the Sejm with the prospect of a 
Muscovite-Swedish military alliance, and he reminded them “the Ukrainian Hetman 
has petitioned the Grand Sovereign to take him, with all the towns, under his lofty 
hand, as the Zaporozhian Ukrainians’ Orthodox faith is perpetually persecuted and 
mortally endangered by Your Highness and the Commonwealth.” In February 19-28 
1651 the tsar convened a Church Council and, in separate session, an Assembly 
of the Realm (Zemskii sobor) to discuss these affronts as well as the charge that 
King Jan Kazimierz was conspiring with the Crimean khan to invade Muscovy. 
The tsar’s report to these assemblies noted that Bohdan Khmel´nyts´kyi and the 
11. Ibid., 141-143; Valerii Stepankov, “Problema viboru protektsii mizh Moskov´skoiu 
derzhavoiu i Osmans´koiu imperieiu u 1648-1654 rokakh” [“The problem of choosing a 
protector in the years 1648-1654: Muscovy or Ottoman Empire?”], in Valerii Smolii, Valentian 
Matiakh, et al., Pereiaslavs´ka rada ta Ukrains´ko-Rosiis´ka ugoda 1654 r. Istoriia, istoriografiia, 
ideologiia [The Pereiaslav rada and the Ukrainian-Russian agreement of 1654. History, histo-
riography, ideology] (Kiev: Institut istorii Ukraini, 2005), 30; V. Stepankov, “Pereiaslav 1654 
roku: vitoki, sutnist´, naslidki” [“Pereiaslav, 1654: origins, content, conséquences”], in Smolii, 
Gorobets´, eds., Ukraina ta Rosiia, p. 96. 
12. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 146-147, 221.
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entire Zaporozhian Host had asked to be taken “under the Sovereign’s lofty hand 
as subjects” (takzhe i zaporozhskogo getmana Bogdana Khmel´nitskogo prisylki 
ob´´iaviti, chto oni b´iut chelom pod gosudarevy vysokuiu ruku v poddanstvo).13 
The Church Council answered : it endorsed the breaking of the armistice with 
Poland and the alliance with the Zaporozhian Host in the event Warsaw refused 
to grant the tsar’s demands. The response of the Assembly of the Realm was not 
recorded or has not survived.
Yet Tsar Aleksei chose not to take action upon the Church Sobor’s verdict — he 
would not break the Polianovka Armistice until another two years had passed — 
and he did not even inform Khmel´nyts´kyi of the assemblies’ decision or of his 
intentions regarding intervention in Ukraine.14
A telling shift in policy towards Cherkas immigration occurred at this time. 
Henceforth the governors of Putivl´, Briansk, and Sevsk were instructed to actively 
encourage it by propagandizing that all Ukrainians seeking relief from Polish 
oppression should prepare their families for resettlement in Muscovy rather than 
cling to vain hopes that the king would make peace with Khmel´nyts´kyi.15
This suggests that Tsar Aleksei still anticipated the defeat of Khmel´nyts´kyi 
and the disintegration of the Hetmanate and was prepared to offer Muscovite 
protectorate over the Zaporozhian Host only in terms of providing a haven for 
Ukrainian refugees on Muscovite soil. Further indication of this is the instruction 
the tsar gave his envoy Larion Lopukhin, sent to the hetman in January 1651 to 
request he turn over all correspondence that might show the king was in collusion 
with the Crimean khan to attack Muscovy. In the original draft of this instruction 
Lopukhin was also authorized to inform Khmel´nyts´kyi that if Muscovy and the 
Commonwealth went to war the hetman and his colonels could cross the border 
and find haven in Muscovy, with stipends and land grants, as had been arranged for 
Ostrianyn and other prominent refugees in the past.16
In spring 1651 Jan Kazimierz led an unusually large Polish army into Bratslav 
and Volhynia while Janusz Radziwiłł made preparations to march on Kiev from 
Lithuania. In June the king’s army crushed the cossacks at Berestechko, a victory 
made possible by the flight of the 50,000 Tatars entrusted with defending the 
cossacks’ left flank. Radziwiłł’s forces took Kiev on 25 July.
The defeat at Berestechko forced Khmel´nyts´kyi to suspend operations 
in Moldavia and step up his diplomacy towards Moscow in hopes of securing 
Muscovite military aid. Although Moscow continued to distrust Khmel´nyts´kyi 
and doubt his prospects for survival, and was still not ready to risk war against the 
13. VUR, n° 1, p. 7 and n° 2, p. 11; L.V. Cherepnin, Zemskie sobory Russkogo gosudarstva v 
XVI- XVII vv. [The Assemblies of the Realm in Russia, XVI th- XVII th centuries] (M.: Nauka, 1978), 
325-327.
14. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 224.
15. VUR, n° 50, p. 100-101.
16. This was subsequently crossed out, however, the tsar having apparently decided that the 
hetman would consider it an unsatisfying offer. VUR, n° 15, p. 26-27, n° 44, p. 93-94, n° 47, 
p. 96-97; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 225.
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Commonwealth, it recognized that it could not afford to close the door altogether 
on negotiations for alliance with him. Russians had to indicate their readiness 
to continue such talks at least as a means of showing the Poles they were not 
intimidated and to counter Polish efforts to push the Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars 
against Muscovy.
After the defeat at Berestechko the tsar had sent Metropolitan Gabriel back to 
Ukraine accompanied by Grigorii Bogdanov, a clerk in the Military Chancellery, 
to remind Khmel´nyts´kyi the tsar had rejected Polish offers of military alliance 
against the cossacks and the Tatars, and to rebuke Khmel´nyts´kyi for having 
trusted in alliance with the Tatars. The hetman responded that if the tsar had 
agreed to take the Zaporozhian Host under his protection he would never have had 
to ally with the Tatars. Bogdanov testified that Khmel´nyts´kyi’s secretary Ivan 
Vyhovsky was especially vocal in calling for a Muscovite protectorate, arguing that 
it would bring the Sovereign new lands and towns, would secure his realm against 
both Polish and Tatar attack, and might even eventually lead to the subjugation of 
Poland-Lithuania. Bogdanov contributed further to the impression that protectorate 
could entail formal political union by alleging that many clergymen, townsmen and 
cossacks he had encountered on the road out of Ukraine had requested “with tears 
in their eyes” that the tsar recognize them as his subjects (poddannye).”17
It is possible Khmel´nyts´kyi was not yet firmly committed to throwing in his 
lot with Muscovy and still counted on assistance from the Ottomans, for talks with 
Mehmet Aga continued at Chyhyryn and Khmel´nyts´kyi had reportedly offered to 
cede Kamianets in return for Ottoman military aid. Vyhovskyi’s correspondence with 
Moscow communicated the sense that there was a split within cossack leadership, with 
Khmel´nyts´kyi and some colonels favoring acceptance of an Ottoman protectorate, 
and Vyhovskyi, Zhdanovich and the cossack rank-and-file opposed to this and in 
favor of a Muscovite protectorate. But it is also possible this split was imaginary, a 
chimera with which Vyhovskyi was trying to alarm the Muscovites.18 
The outbreak of partisan resistance in Bratslav palatinate had by now blocked the 
king’s further advance and forced Radziwiłł to withdraw from Kiev to rendezvous 
with the king at Pavoloch. In September Khmel´nyts´kyi won a great victory at Bila 
Tserkva. But if the military situation at the end of 1651 could be called a stalemate, 
the political situation was more clearly one of major setback for Khmel´nyts´ky: 
the armistice signed at Bila Tserkva on 18 September cut back the cossack register 
and restored Bratslav and Chernigov to the Commonwealth, reducing the territory 
of the Hetmanate to Kiev palatinate. The Bila Tserkva Treaty was also a setback for 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s Moldavian project, for if he continued campaigning in Moldavia 
he risked breaking the armistice with Poland and provoking a new invasion by 
17. Note Bogdanov´s loose use of “subjects” (poddanye), which he applies even to the Don 
Cossacks. VUR, n° 33, p. 77 ; ibid., n° 52, p. 116-118 ; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 
338-339.
18. Stepankov, “Problema viboru,” 32-33; Iurii Mytsyk, Getman Ivan Vyhovskyi [The hetman 
Ivan Vyhovskyi] (Kiev: KM Akademiia, 2004), 20.
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Hetman Potocki. Vasile Lupu was now in alliance with Poland and there were 
indications Transylvania and Wallachia were joining the anti-Zaporozhian coalition 
and the Ottomans were no longer willing to tolerate Khmel´nyts´kyi’s interference 
in Moldavia.19 
Khmel´nyts´kyi recognized the Bila Tserkva treaty was unlikely to stand for 
very long. Its harsh terms were provoking unrest among the rank-and-file cossacks, 
peasantry, and townsmen, confronting him with the possibility he would have to 
resume war with the king if he was to remain in power as hetman; yet past experience 
also showed that going back to war with the Crimean Tatars as his only significant 
allies would inevitably leave him abandoned and betrayed again. By February 1652 
the number of cossacks remaining under Khmel´nyts´kyi’s banner was rumored to 
have fallen to just 20,000.20
The failure of Muscovite envoys at Warsaw to obtain satisfaction of the tsar’s 
grievances against the king and the magnates did give Khmel´nyts´kyi reason to 
again request Muscovite protectorate, however. Through his envoy Semen Savich 
and through letters to the governors at Putivl´ and other Muscovite border towns 
Khmel´nyts´kyi proclaimed his readiness to “serve” the Tsar-without, however, 
specifying what kind of military/political arrangement he was seeking. The tsar still 
held back from pledging military intervention in Ukraine. When Khmel´nyts´kyi’s 
envoy Ivan Iskra again asked the tsar to take the Zaporozhian Host under protection 
in March 1652, Tsar Aleksei answered he was prepared only to allow the Host to 
resettle on Muscovite territory along the Donets and Medveditsa and other parts of 
the steppe.21 
In May 1652 the hetman decided to renew his campaign in Moldavia. Crimean 
Tatar grievances against the Poles and Moldavians had raised his hopes he could 
bring them back into alliance with him, and the Polish army was demoralized by 
pay arrears. He calculated that victory in Moldavia might strengthen his position 
in several ways: it could intimidate Lupu into abandoning his alliance with the 
Commonwealth and giving his daughter’s hand to Tymysh Khmel´nyts´kyi; it 
could end Lupu’s efforts to block closer Ukrainian strategic partnership with the 
Khanate and the Porte; it might enlist Janusz Radziwiłł as a new ally supporting 
the Hetmanate’s struggle for independence from the Polish crown; and it might 
even persuade Radziwiłł to help place a fellow Calvinist, Zsigmond Rakoczi, on 
the Polish throne.22 In late May a Polish army under Kalinowski attempting to block 
Ukrainian and Tatar forces marching upon Moldavia was massacred at Batih. But 
Khmel´nyts´kyi was then forced to turn back from Moldavia after failing to take 
the Polish fortress at Kamianets and noting new signs of wavering among his Tatar 
auxiliaries. 
19. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 403-404, 465-466.
20. Ibid., 425-426.
21. VUR, n° 101, p. 208-210; Solov´ev, bk. 5, t. 10, 584-585.
22. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 466.
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These events left Moscow uncertain whether the Bila Tserkva armistice was 
about to break down entirely and the Poles finally crush the Hetmanate, or whether 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s efforts to resume operations would require him to accept full 
dependency upon the sultan and the khan. Vyhovskyi combated these doubts by 
recommending himself as the tsar’s surest friend and confidant within the Hetmanate, 
promising to exert all his considerable influence to persuade Khmel´nyts´kyi to 
abandon the Ottomans and Tatars and place the Zaporozhian Host under the tsar’s 
protection. He acknowledged there were “many people” urging the hetman to 
accept full vassalage to the sultan, but he vouched for the hetman’s preference for 
a Muscovite protectorate, provided that protectorate be offered soon; then southern 
Muscovy would be secured against Tatar attack.23 
In December 1652 Khmel´nyts´kyi’s envoy Bohdanovich-Zarudny again 
communicated the hetman’s request that the tsar take the Zaporozhian Host “under 
his Sovereign lofty hand” and protect it from its enemies. Bohdanovich-Zarudny 
testified that Potocki, Wisniowiecki, and Koniecpolski were eager to resume war 
upon the Zaporozhian Host; half the Sejm was with them, and apparently King Jan 
Kazimierz as well, for it had been discovered that the king had sent agents to Crimea 
to try to bribe the khan into betraying the Host and joining Commonwealth forces in 
a spring invasion of Ukraine. The king was assembling an army for this purpose near 
Sokol´ and Volodimer, and a second army under Field Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł 
was being formed along the Rechitsa River in Lithuania. Fortunately Radziwiłł’s 
army was small and mobilization of the king’s army had been held up by the spread 
of plague through southern Poland. The Khan had given assurance he had rejected 
the king’s bribes, so Polish and Lithuanian forces were not expected to be operating 
with a significant number of Tatar auxiliaries. Khmel´nyts´kyi estimated some 
300,000 Ukrainians were prepared to take up arms against the invaders — the larger 
part of them would be needed for local defense and to deter opportunistic Tatar 
raiding, of course, so Khmel´nyts´kyi’s field army would still need to be reinforced 
with Muscovite troops. As for the Tatar forces currently in Ukraine, Bohdanovich-
Zarudny thought there were about 20,000 Nogais, mostly nomadizing close to the 
Ukrainian towns, the hetman having allowed this to deter Polish attack upon the 
towns, and the Nogais content with the arrangement because it allowed them to trade 
with the townspeople, selling off their captives for food and fodder. 
The Muscovite government’s initial response was cautious and limited to vague 
assurances : it would continue mediating between the Hetmanate and the Polish 
crown while remaining open to further proposals and standing ready to “protect” 
Orthodox Ukrainians in the event the king failed to satisfy the tsar’s demands and 
the tsar was forced to go to war against Poland.24 It still held back from offering 
23. “You know that I, with God’s help, am the master of all matters in the Zaporozhian Host. 
The hetman and the colonels and the entire Zaporozhian Host listen to me and respect me […] 
and trust me in everything.” Vyhovskyi did request asylum on Muscovite territory in the event 
he failed, however. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 491; VUR, n° 115, p. 221-222.
24. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 511-513 ; VUR, n° 133, p. 239-240, n° 138, 
p. 244-246.
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a protectorate guaranteeing the integrity of the territory of the Hetmanate. On 29 
January Tsar Aleksei asked Bohdanovich-Zarudny, “How and by what means are 
Hetman Khmel´nits´ky and the whole Zaporozhian Host to be under His Sovereign’s 
lofty hand? And where are they to reside: there, in their towns, or somewhere else? 
What have you been instructed about this?” Bohdanovich-Zarudny had to reply that 
he did not know, as the hetman had not instructed him on this matter.25
Summer 1653: the turning point
What finally moved the Muscovites to pledge the tsar’s protectorate was, first, their 
perception of the growing danger of a Polish-Tatar alliance capable of destroying the 
Hetmanate and invading the Muscovite borderlands, and, second, the possibility of 
exploiting Khmel´nyts´kyi’s desperation in order to bind him to assisting Muscovy 
with certain other projects. Establishment of a fuller Muscovite sovereignty 
over Ukraine than Khmel´nyts´kyi had previously sought was not, however, the 
most important of these projects at this time; Moscow was more preoccupied 
with obtaining the Hetmanate’s support for the subjugation of Lithuania and the 
confessionalization of the Muscovite Orthodox Church along Ukrainian lines. 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s position in early 1653 was actually less secure than Bohdano-
vich-Zarudny acknowledged.
Since autumn 1652 cholera epidemic and famine had spread across Ukraine, 
taking thousands of lives and driving thousands more to flee across the border 
(Khmel´nyts´kyi himself was at one point rumored to have died in the epidemic). 
The Hetmanate may have lost as much as 40% of its population to this catastrophe. 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s army was disintegrating; the number of effectives he could field 
had dropped from 130,000 to 50 or 60,000 men, and his Crimean Tatar allies were 
leaving him — just 300 of them remained under his standard, in exchange for 
regular pay, while the rest were returning to Crimea after plundering the districts he 
had turned over to them for “feeding.” The hetman’s compromise at Bila Tsirkva, 
his costly adventure in Moldavia, and his inability to protect his own people against 
Tatar raiding had done much to alienate the Ukrainian townsmen and gentry and the 
cossack rank-and-file. There was growing dissatisfaction in the Sich, in the original 
Zaporozhian Host, which resented its eclipse by the new Hetmanate that had 
borrowed its name. Alienation from Khmel´nyts´kyi’s leadership was especially 
advanced on the Left Bank. Some dissident cossacks broke from the Host and 
formed their own camp at Gorodok Bedrikiv´skii.26 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s project in Moldavia had broken down irretrievably. Although 
Vasile Lupu had given Roksanda’s hand to Tymysh in August 1652, Tymysh’s 
ambitions in Wallachia soon provoked the overthrow of Lupu; Lupu’s successor, 
25. AJuZR 3, n° 335, p. 487.
26. Stepankov, “Pereiaslav 1654 roku,” 99 ; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 513-514, 
535; VUR, n° 122, p. 229-230, n° 129, p. 235.
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Gheorghe Stefan, allied with King Jan Kazimierz, Wallachian hospodar Matei 
Basarab, and Prince Gyorgy II Rakoczi and drove Tymysh and his cossacks from 
Moldavia. 
Adam Kysil’s recommendations no longer carried much weight in Warsaw (he 
would die later in the spring); the Commonwealth’s Ukraine policy was now in the 
hands of warhawks uninterested in preserving the Bila Tserkva peace (the Sejm 
had never even ratified the treaty, viewing its terms as too generous and forgiving). 
King Jan Kazimierz and Crown Hetman Stanisław Potocki cited Khmel´nyts´kyi’s 
meddling in Moldavia and solicitation of foreign protectorates as violations of 
the Zboriv and Bila Tserkva treaties and sent a Polish army of 15,000 men under 
Stefan Czarniecki into the Hetmanate in March 1653, burning ten towns and killing 
thousands.
Tsar Aleksei met with his Duma councilors on 22 February-14 March to discuss 
preparations for war against the Commonwealth. On 19 March the tsar summoned 
a session of the Assembly of the Realm for 20 May to begin examining the issue 
of breaking the Polianovka Armistice and taking the Zaporozhian Host under 
protection.27 
Various speculations have been offered as to what now pushed the tsar closer to 
deciding to risk military intervention in Ukraine and war with the Commonwealth. 
If the tsar was taking Bohdanovich-Zarudny’s reassurances at face value, he may 
have decided the cossacks were willing to abandon their Bila Tserkva armistice 
and remained strong enough to be useful allies against the Tatars and the Poles. 
Conversely, if he was more convinced by other reports out of Ukraine attesting to 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s desperate straits, the tsar may have concluded his protectorate 
could now be negotiated on terms more favorable to the tsar, giving him sovereignty 
over the lands and towns as well as the cossack leadership of the Hetmanate. Both of 
these explanations, however, assume that the Muscovite government was confident 
the Hetmanate would withstand Polish-Tatar invasion.
A third and more likely explanation was that the tsar was motivated first of all 
by concerns about the Hetmanate saving itself by throwing itself upon the mercy of 
the Ottoman sultan and the Crimean khan — and thereby joining them in hostility 
to Muscovy. Failure at this crucial juncture to offer Khmel´nyts´kyi protectorate 
might drive the hetman into the closer embrace of the Ottoman sultan, especially 
now that the Porte no longer had reason to complain of Khmel´nyts´kyi’s meddling 
in Moldavian affairs and Khan Islam Girei III was still insisting on acceptance of 
the sultan’s protectorate as the price for full Crimean Tatar military support. 
For his part, Khmel´nyts´kyi now had to make a final decision as to whether 
to stand with the Ottomans or with Muscovy. His past rapprochement with the 
Turks was currently working to limit his freedom of diplomatic maneuver. This 
27. V.I. Picheta, “Vneshnaia politika Rossii pri tsare Aleksee Mikhailoviche” [“The foreign 
policy of Russia under tsar Aleksei Mihailovich”], in V.V. Kallash, ed., Tri veka: Rossiia ot 
Smuty do nashego vremeni. Tom II. XVII veka. Vtoraia polovina [Three centuries: Russia from 
the Time of Troubles to present day. Vol. II. The second half of XVIIth century] (M.: GIS, reprint 
ed., 1991), 117; Solov´ev, Istoriia Rossii, 588.
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rapprochement had never succeeded in bringing him meaningful Ottoman military 
assistance against the Poles or guaranteeing the Crimean Tatars would remain 
reliable allies. Now there were reports of a Polish-Crimean alliance forming against 
him. But even if Khmel´nyts´kyi had wanted to throw off his vassalage to the sultan 
he could not afford to end negotiations with the Turks lest this break his peace with 
the Tatars. Letting Moscow know he remained in negotiations with the Turks had 
some utility, reminding the tsar of the possible cost to Muscovy of delay on offering 
Muscovite protectorate; but Khmel´nyts´kyi now had to step up his diplomacy with 
Moscow, and carefully and surreptitiously, lest the khan get wind a Muscovite 
protectorate was imminent and join the Poles in invading Ukraine.28 
On 25 March (NS) 1653 Khmel´nyts´kyi dispatched a new mission (Kindrat 
Burliai and Syluian Muzhilovsky) to Moscow to announce that he had reopened war 
against the Poles and requesting again the tsar to take the Zaporozhian Host under 
his protection and render it military aid against the Poles. Burliai and Muzhilovsky 
were questioned in the Ambassadors’ Chancellery negotiations on 22 April 1653; 
on the following day they had an audience with Patriarch Nikon. On 7 May the tsar 
released Burliai and Muzhilovsky and sent his own mission to Chyhyryn, headed 
by dvorianin Artemon Matveev and clerk Ivan Fomin.29
By the summer of 1653 additional developments made negotiation of a 
Muscovite protectorate and military alliance more urgent for Khmel´nyts´kyi and 
more advantageous for the tsar. 
First, Czarniecki’s invasion of Ukraine had already shown that the Poles had 
given up on the armistice of Bila Tserkva; subsequent events now suggested neither 
Ukrainian nor Muscovite diplomacy could restore the peace. The Poles invaded 
again in August, in greater force. This Polish army would be halted and encircled 
in Podol´ia in September, but its failure had the consequence of bending King Jan 
Kazimierz to accept an armistice with the Crimean Khan (the Zhvanets Treaty in 
early December 1653). B.A. Repnin’s mission to Warsaw no longer held promise 
of success, either; in June King Jan Kazimierz and the Polish government rejected 
the concessions the tsar deemed necessary to preserve the Polianovka Armistice 
and keep Muscovy out of the war between the Commonwealth and the Hetmanate. 
The king instead issued his own ultimatum for the Zaporozhian Host to overthrow 
Khmel´nyts´kyi, lay down its arms, and request amnesty.
Second, Khmel´nyts´kyi increasingly needed a Muscovite protectorate to restore 
his own authority within the Hetmanate. The breakdown of his armistice with 
Poland, Tatar raiding, and the failure of his Moldavian adventure had eroded his 
support in Ukraine, yet his need to maintain a constant war footing and maximum 
unity of command made it dangerous for him to submit decisions for ratification by 
general councils of cossacks; so he tended all the more to decide policy just with 
Vyhovskyi and his entourage; even consultations with councils of his colonels had 
28. Stepankov, “Pereiaslav 1654 roku”; S.V. Lobachev, Patriarkh Nikon [Patriarch Nikon] 
(SPb.: Iskusstvo-SPB, 2003), 136-138.
29. Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 548-549; VUR, nos 153, 154.
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become less frequent. To survive, then, Khmel´nyts´kyi needed to autocratize his 
authority as hetman; and to legitimate hetmanal autocracy he now needed to turn 
to the Orthodox Church and press it to acclaim him as a divinely elected sovereign. 
Since the time of Petro Mohyla, however, the Kiev metropolitanate had pursued its 
own program for protecting the Ukrainian Orthodox flock and had been resistant to 
ceding leadership to the cossacks and their hetmans, and the current metropolitan, 
Sylvestr Kosov, still hoped to achieve reconciliation with Warsaw. Khmel´nyts´kyi 
therefore had to seek consecration as sovereign from elsewhere — from Jerusalem 
Patriarch Paisios (1649) and from Constantinople Patriarch Athanasios III Patelaros 
and Antioch Patriarch Makarios (1654).30
Serhii Plokhy argues this was an important factor in finally committing 
Khmel´nyts´kyi to accepting a Muscovite protectorate. By appealing to the tsar 
and Patriarch Nikon and invoking the Orthodox unity rhetoric of Boretsky and 
Kopynsky, Khmel´nyts´kyi hoped to win Moscow Patriarch Nikon’s recognition 
of the hetman’s authority as patron and protector over the Ukrainian Church. 
The hetman could then press Metropolitan Sylvestr to recognize his sovereignty 
in exchange for the hetman’s pledge to safeguard the autonomy of the Ukrainian 
Church. “Given the choice of submitting to the Muscovite authorities and the 
patriarch of Moscow, Kosov gave clear preference to Khmelnytsky.”31
It is unlikely Metropolitan Sylvestr would knowingly embrace a Muscovite 
protectorate on terms requiring the Ukrainian Orthodox church’s detachment from 
the Constantinople Patriarchate and its full absorption into the Moscow Patriarchate. 
The Orthodox unity rhetoric inherited from Boretsky and Kopnynsky had always 
spoken of the tsar’s protectorate in terms of his duty to defend the Orthodox faith and 
therefore to preserve their church’s privileges and liberties; and it is for this reason 
they spoke of the prestige of Kiev as the symbol of the original unity of Orthodoxy 
and of Rus´. This rhetoric had recently been revived at Moscow by the emigre 
Kievan monks Epifanii Slavinetskii and Arsenii Satanovsky, who metaphorized the 
tsar’s protectorate as an eagle with outstretched wings.32 
Moscow’s new Patriarch, Nikon, was receptive to this rhetoric, interested 
in Muscovite-Ukrainian rapprochement as an opportunity to enlist the aid of 
Ukrainian religious intellectuals in confessionalizing the Muscovite church, and 
ideally positioned to influence the tsar on the matter. Burliai’s and Muzhilovsky’s 
appeals for the tsar’s protection may have been given a more enthusiastic hearing at 
Patriarch Nikon’s court than at the Ambassadors’ Chancellery. On 14 May Nikon 
wrote to the hetman informing him that the mission of Artemon Matveev and 
Fedor Lodyzhenskii was on its way to Chyhyryn and Nikon would press the tsar 
30. Plokhy, The Cossacks and Religion, 207-208, 212-220.
31. Ibid., 228, 256.
32. S. Plokhy, “Krila protektsii: do viznacheniia pravovogo zmistu Pereiaslav´skoi ugodi 1654 
roku” [“The wings of protection : what was the meaning of Pereiaslav agreement of 1654 ?“], 
Medievalia Ucrainica 4 (1995): 76-85, reproduced online at www.ukrhistory.narod.ru/texts/
plhiy-1htm ; p. 5 of on-line version.
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to offer his protection to the Zaporozhian Host. On 25 May the tsar met in special 
council with his Duma boyars, the Patriarch, the Metropolitan of Krutitsa, and the 
archimandrites and hegumens of leading monasteries to discuss “Lithuanian and 
Ukrainian affairs.” In August Khmel´nyts´kyi wrote to Nikon thanking him for his 
intercession with the tsar.33 
It is possible that Nikon already envisioned Muscovite protectorate as preparing 
the ground for something more than what Khmel´nyts´kyi and Ukrainian churchmen 
were bargaining for: the eventual subordination of the Kievan metropolitanate to 
the Moscow patriarchate. In July 1653 a new edition of the Pilot Book (Kormchaia 
kniga) was issued, revised by Nikon to highlight the text of Jerusalem Patriarch 
Theophanes’ 1619 investiture of Rostov Metropolitan Filaret as Moscow Patriarch, 
a text proclaiming the duty of the tsar to preserve the Orthodox faith and “gather” 
the Orthodox lands.34 At the final negotiations for protectorate at Pereiaslav the text 
of Buturlin’s representations of the tsar’s understanding of protectorate terms made 
heavy use of religious rhetoric that may have been inspired by Nikon.  
From Moscow’s perspective the most important development of all was 
occurring not in Ukraine, but in Lithuanian Belarus´. Almost from its beginning, 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s revolt against the Commonwealth had inspired uprisings 
by townsmen, peasants, and newly cossackized elements in Brest, Gomel´, 
Minsk, Mogilev, Bykhov, Bobruisk and other districts, and detachments of 
Ukrainian cossacks had entered Lithuania to try to link up these insurgencies with 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s operations. The growing political instability in Lithuania seemed 
to offer the tsar the opportunity to achieve a project long dearer to him than the 
pursuit of influence over Ukraine: the recovery of Smolensk and the other western 
territories lost to the Commonwealth in 1618. Khmel´nyts´kyi had even claimed 
Smolensk was ready to petition to be placed under the tsar’s protection.35 
King Jan Kazimierz had entrusted Janusz Radziwiłł, Lithuanian Grand Hetman 
and Palatine of Vilnius, with the tasks of suppressing the revolts in Belarus´ and 
launching a counter-offensive into northern Ukraine. But Radziwiłł was expected 
to accomplish this with comparatively small forces — a few thousand Lithuanian 
gentry militia and German mercenaries. The fighting in Lithuania had been 
especially savage, and although Radziwiłł had managed to take most of the rebel 
strongholds by the summer of 1651 he was never able to completely pacify the 
region, so that fear of renewed rebellion in his army’s rear kept him from sending it 
into northern Ukraine for extended operations. Furthermore, Radziwiłł, a Calvinist, 
was a fervid opponent of Polish “military absolutism” and sought to expand his 
family’s power in Lithuania at the crown’s expense; with Tymysh’s marriage to 
Roksanda Radziwiłł had become an in-law to the Khmel´nytsk´yis; Radziwiłł had 
33. VUR, n° 165, p. 286-287.
34. Lobachev, Patriarkh Nikon, 140; Oleksii Putro, “Patriarkh Nikon — khreshchenii bat´ko 
Pereiaslavs´koi ugodi 1654 roku” [“Patriarch Nikon, godfather of Pereiaslav agreement of 
1654”], in Smolii, Matiakh, eds., Pereiaslavs´ka rada, 99, 104-110.
35. VUR, n° 132, p. 259.
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already thwarted Polish interests on occasion, having instigated the first use of the 
liberum veto to paralyze the Sejm; and it was therefore of considerable interest 
to Moscow that Radziwiłł began forming a peace party in February 1653 and 
that Khmel´nyts´kyi had obtained letters Radziwiłł had sent to the Wallachian 
hospodar expressing his anxiety that the king’s war with the hetman could leave 
the Commonwealth vulnerable to Swedish invasion. The cossack envoys Burliai 
and Muzhilovsky apparently strove to convince Moscow that Radziwiłł would 
remain neutral if Ukrainian and Muscovite forces began operations on the territory 
of Lithuanian Belarus´. In the summer and fall of 1653 Vyhovskyi wrote of the 
likelihood that Belarus´ would follow the example of the Hetmanate in accepting a 
Muscovite protectorate.36 
These reports seemed to identify the most effective way of assisting 
Khmel´nyts´kyi while serving the tsar’s paramount interest, thus: directing the larger 
part of Muscovite forces against Lithuania, the Commonwealth’s most vulnerable 
region, defeat of which would then restore to the tsar Smolensk, Seversk, and the 
lands of west Rus´. Khmel´nyts´kyi’s cossacks had been operating in Lithuania from 
1648 with the purpose of bringing their insurgency to the Orthodox population of 
west Rus´, so there was good precedent for requiring that Khmel´nyts´kyi support 
Muscovite army operations in west Rus´ in return for assistance in Ukraine.37
36. AJuZR 8, n° 38, p. 364-365; L.S. Abetsedarskii, “Bor´ba belorusskogo naroda za vossoe-
dinenie s Rossieiu” [“The struggle of the Bielorussian people to be reunited with Russia”], 
in A. Baranovich et al., eds., Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei. Sbornik statei [The reuniting 
of Ukraine and Russia. A collection of articles] (M.: AN SSSR, 1954), 181-183, 187-191, 
203-206, 214-215; Hrushevsky, History of Ukraine-Rus´, 549-550; VUR, n° 153, p. 264-266 
and n° 195, p. 402.
37. Muscovite military deployments in the first months of 1654 offer further evidence that 
alliance with Ukraine was valued in Moscow first of all for the support it offered to Muscovite 
operations in Lithuanian west Rus´, that Moscow did not initially expect to have to honor major 
military commitments on the territory of the Hetmanate. On 15-18 May 1654 three Muscovite 
army groups comprising 71,000 troops and 4,000 guns invaded Lithuania with the primary 
objective of retaking Smolensk and the west Rus´ territories ceded to the Grand Duchy twenty 
years before. Their secondary objective was to seize other Lithuanian Belarus´ domains north of 
the Western Dvina and Dnepr. Hetman Khmel´nyts´kyi provided, as pledged, 20,000 mounted 
and foot cossacks under Colonel I.N. Zolotarenko. Their mission was to push north through 
Starodub into Lithuania to occupy territory along the line Gomel´-Propoisk-Staryi Bykhov, 
support the southernmost of the three Muscovite army groups, and protect the Hetmanate from 
Lithuanian counterattack. Operations in Ukraine in this period involved much smaller Musco-
vite forces than the fighting in Lithuania. Just one Muscovite corps — A.V. Buturlin’s, from 
Ryl´sk — was sent into Ukraine for joint operations with Khmel´nyts´kyi’s army; it consisted 
of only 3,950 Komaritskaia dragoons, 246 deti boiarskie, a few dozen cossacks, and some 
artillery. It arrived at Kiev on 19 June and rendezvoused with the hetman’s army at Fastov on 
11 July. Meanwhile Kiev was garrisoned by roughly 2,000 soldaty and middle service caval-
rymen under the command of F.S. Kurakin and F.F. Volkonskii. The total strength of Musco-
vite forces in Ukraine therefore did not much exceed 6,000 men. Further indication of the 
secondary importance Moscow accorded the Ukrainian theater at this time was the subsequent 
decision to order A.V. Buturlin to detach part of his command to reinforce A.N. Trubetskoi’s 
corps near Lutsk in Lithuania. Thus Moscow saw no need to send great numbers of troops 
into Ukraine because it expected Khmel´nyts´kyi’s army could afford to spare Zolotarenko’s 
20,000 cossacks for the Lithuanian campaign while still securing the Tatar invasion roads, 
protecting the western flank of the Belgorod Line, and throwing back any new Polish offensive 
from the west. Cf. Davies, Warfare, State and Society, 115, 117-119.
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In June Matveev and Fomin reported from Ukraine concerning the news of 
Tymysh’s defeat in Moldavia, Polish and Ottoman activities, and — matters of 
special interest to Moscow — the state of Ivan Vyhovskyi’s influence within the 
Hetmanate, his readiness to serve the tsar, and his opinion as to the significance of 
the hetman’s negotiations with the Ottomans. Vyhovskyi represented that most of 
the colonels were advising Khmel´nyts´kyi to accept an Ottoman protectorate but 
that he and Colonel Zhdanovich-Zarudny had so far succeeded in persuading the 
hetman otherwise. According to the report of Matveev and Fomin, Khmel´nyts´kyi 
and Vyhovskyi had announced to them on 4 July their request that “we be taken 
under His Sovereign’s lofty hand in eternal servitude (v vechnoe kholopstvo), and 
we will serve him, the Grand Sovereign […] with the entire Zaporozhian Host, 
to our deaths, and will give up our lives for him wherever His Tsarist Majesty 
commands us.”38
On 22 June, in response to reports that the hetman was continuing to negotiate 
with the Turks, Tsar Aleksei issued a decree rescript informing Khmel´nyts´kyi he 
had decided to place the Hetmanate under his protection and was readying his army 
for war: “We have deigned to take you under the lofty hand of His Tsarist Majesty 
so that you may not be a proverb and a byword to the enemies of the cross of Christ,” 
i.e., to spare Ukraine the shame of having to accept Ottoman protection. This 
rescript was taken to Chyhyryn by stol´nik Fedor Abrosimovich Lodyzhenskii.39 
The hetman responded on 9 August with two letters, one to Nikon asking him 
to convince the tsar to hasten with military assistance against the Poles, the other 
to the tsar, assuring him the Ukrainians desired to serve no other sovereign but 
hoped that the Muscovite army would arrive soon. On 17 August, in talks with 
Moscow’s envoy Ivan Fomin, Khmel´nyts´kyi promised to send appeals to the 
Orthodox of Orsha, Mstislavl´, and other districts to rise up against Lithuanian rule 
and aid the coming Muscovite campaign in Belarus´. The next day, in Fomin’s 
presence, Khmel´nyts´kyi pledged to serve the tsar with the entire Host if the tsar 
“would permit me, the hetman, with the entire Zaporozhian Host, to be taken under 
His Sovereign’s lofty hand in eternal servitude.” He added that if the tsar took the 
Hetmanate under protection “then the Crimean khan and murzas, who are friends to 
me and listen to me, would be in eternal servitude to His Tsarist Majesty.” This is 
another indication Khmel´nyts´kyi intended “eternal servitude” to denote permanent 
alliance, not formal recognition of the tsar’s full sovereignty over Ukraine.40
The next mission from Moscow — Rodion Matveevich Streshnev’s mission of 
12 September-7 January 1654 — had the task of assessing the loyalty and military 
value of the Hetmanate as ally and determining whether Khmel´nyts´kyi understood 
38. This was the first reference in the Muscovite-Ukrainian diplomacy to readiness to accept 
“eternal servitude” to the tsar, but the context suggests Khmel´nyts´kyi and Vyhov´skyi were 
speaking of accepting, at least permanent alliance with the tsar, and at most personal vassalage 
to him, and using their authority to commit the Zaporozhian Host to assisting Muscovite armies 
in Lithuania. VUR, n° 166, p. 303-304, 307, 313.
39. VUR, n° 169, p. 323.
40. VUR, n° 181, 183, 184, p. 360-362, 364-365.
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and accepted that the tsar was offering his protection over the towns and lands of 
the Hetmanate as well as over its leaders.41
The Muscovite Assembly of the Realm had deliberated on the Polish and 
Ukrainian questions as early as May, but it was on 1 October, after hearing the 
report of Warsaw’s rebuff of Repnin’s final appeal, that the Assembly of the Realm 
and Boyar Duma formally assented to “undertake war against the Polish king […] 
and receive the Zaporozhian Host with its towns and lands.” They approved the 
tsar’s choice of Vasilii Buturlin to head a mission to Ukraine to arrange the terms 
of protectorate.42 
Khmel´nyts´kyi was informed of the Assembly of the Realm’s decision in the 
second week of November. By the end of the month he saw new reason to hasten 
to accept the tsar’s offer, for his encirclement of the Polish army at Zhvanets had 
forced the king to accept vizier Sefergazy Aga’s terms for a Polish-Crimean alliance 
against the Hetmanate and Muscovy. This treaty was ratified by 15 December. 
Over the next two days Khmel´nyts´kyi held council with his colonels to weigh its 
consequences and discuss accepting the tsar’s protectorate; he did not, however, 
inform Moscow of what he had learned of the Polish-Crimean alliance and in 
discussions with Rodion Streshnev on 5 January 1654 he still acted as if unalarmed 
by it and confident the Tatars would step back from allying with the Poles once they 
learned he had accepted the tsar’s protectorate. He may have calculated that the 
new Zhvanets treaty of Polish-Tatar alliance would hold no longer than the Zboriv 
and Bila Tserkva treaties.43 
Ukrainian and Muscovite understandings of Protectorate
Thus far Ukrainian-Muscovite diplomatic exchanges had spoken of the Zaporozhian 
Host being taken “under the Sovereign’s lofty hand” as “subjects” in “eternal 
servitude” without defining these concepts more concretely or discussing the actual 
rights and duties of the Host under the tsar’s protectorate. The notes (zapisi) prepared 
in the Ambassadors’ Chancellery of the addresses delivered by the hetman’s envoys, 
as well as the reports (stateinye spiski) from the tsar’s envoys at Chyhyryn, are not 
verbatim transcripts of exchanges but paraphrased summaries and so leave unclear 
whether these terms were actually used by the hetman’s emissaries or are Muscovite 
officials’ understanding of the gist of their remarks. These concepts did not yet appear 
to have clear meaning to those who were using them, for they were sometimes used 
inconsistently (as when Grigorii Bogdanov spoke of the Don Cossacks as subjects, 
41. VUR, n° 194, p. 378-379, n° 195, p. 381-405.
42. VUR, n° 197, p. 406-414; AJuZR 3, n° 343; AJuZR 8, n° 39; Cherepnin, Zemskie sobory, 
327-337.
43. Stepankov, “Pereiaslav 1654 roku,” 102-104; G.A. Sanin, Otnosheniia Rossii i Ukrainy 
s Krymskim khanstvom v seredine XVII veka [The relations of Russia and Ukraine with the 
Crimean khanate in the middle of XVIIth century] (M.: Nauka, 1987), 47.
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poddanye, of the tsar). The rhetoric employed in these exchanges alluded to what we 
would understand as protectorate and vassalage but the modern terms protektorat, 
popechitel´stvo, and vassalitet of course never appeared in the discourse. The terms 
edinoe derzhavstvo or edinoe soedinenie were at one point employed, but only on 
one occasion in April 1651, and without further elaboration, by a Greek monk the 
hetman had sent to Moscow.44 
Speculation therefore continues as to the kind of arrangement Khmel´nyts´kyi 
expected to negotiate with the Muscovites: an alliance; a protectorate founded 
upon the hetman’s personal vassalage to the tsar; a protectorate founded upon the 
tributary dependency of the Hetmanate’s inhabitants; or a permanent confederative 
state? We cannot know his intentions and expectations, but given the history of 
Khmel´nyts´kyi’s wide-ranging diplomacy and efforts to use the Ukrainian Church 
to propagandize for his sovereignty as hetman, his immediate need must have been 
for a union that would bring effective military alliance — enough real military 
assistance to consolidate Ukraine’s independence from the Commonwealth and 
deter Tatar invasion — and his optimal ultimate goal might have been a union 
guaranteeing him acknowledged sovereignty as  hetman so that he could build a 
Ukrainian cossack state strong enough to eventually achieve independence: i.e., 
a protectorate that treated the Hetmanate as a protégé regime, protected until it 
reached political maturity. 
The understanding of protectorate then gaining currency in Sweden and 
Western Europe was articulated in Grotius´ De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) and 
based on precedents back to the age of the Roman Empire. The primary purpose 
of a protectorate treaty was to secure a military alliance between militarily unequal 
polities; signatories to a protectorate treaty were to be considered semi-dependent 
allied tributaries — vassals — rather than full subjects of the sovereign providing 
protection; their own administrative institutions and armed forces were to be left 
intact, although ultimate authority over the disposition of their armed forces was 
exercised by the protecting sovereign; the vassal polity was required to pay tribute 
to guarantee its defense by the protector’s army, but the tribute was to be collected 
by the vassal power’s own officials; and obligations imposed under protectorate had 
to respect the corporate privileges of the population of the vassal polity. Historical 
practice showed that most treaties of protectorate were transitory and were 
eventually annulled when they no longer accorded with the strategic situation and 
the population of the vassal polity judged the obligations they imposed outweighed 
the benefit of the protection they provided.45 Princes and elites considering placing 
their domain under protectorate therefore had reason to expect the vassalage they 
were incurring was temporary, securing them the military aid they needed to 
44. Picheta, “Vneshnaia politika,” 113; VUR, n° 25, p. 66-67.
45. E.I. Kobzarev, “Resheniia Pereiaslavskoi rady s tochki zreniia norm mezhdunarodnogo 
prava XVII veka” [“The decisions of Pereiaslav rada from the point of view of XVIIth century 
international law regulations”], in A.N. Sakharov, ed., Istoriia russko-ukrainskikh otnoshenii v 
XVII- XVIII vekakh [History of Ukrainian-Russian relations in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries] (M.: 
Institut rossiiskoi istorii RAN, 2006), 101-105.
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survive immediate threats to their existence, and that they could take advantage 
of protectorate to build their power and eventually proclaim and sustain their full 
independence; i.e., a state under protectorate was a protégé state.
It is unlikely that Khmel´nyts´kyi and Vyhovskyi were familiar with Grotius, but 
Eastern European practice did provide precedents for treaties of protectorate and 
union — in fact a range of possible protectorate and union models, some promising 
greater advantages to the Hetmanate than others. The difficulty was that they were 
either impossible for Khmel´nyt´skyi to arrange given his current strategic position, 
or they were mutable in form and could not guarantee that the autonomy recognized 
at the start would still be honored in a few years’ time.
The model of political union most familiar to Khmel´nyts´kyi and Vyhovskyi 
would have been the 1569 Lublin Union joining the Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
with the Kingdom of Poland — an act of federation the Lithuanians considered 
preserved the sovereignty of their Grand Duchy. The example of the Commonwealth 
provided an additional attraction in that from 1572 it was under an elective 
monarchy — which allowed the Sejm to elect foreign princes (an Anjou, a Bathory, 
Vasas) prevented by constitutional contract from exercising absolute dominion or 
annexing the Commonwealth to their foreign patrimonies. Hence Khmel´nyts´kyi 
had initially (1647-8) sought King Władysław IV’s recognition of the Zaporozhian 
Host as a vassal entity [virnist´ piddanstva nashogo z virnoiu ritsars´koiu sluzhboiu] 
with particular ancient rights and privileges elevating it above other palatinates of 
the Commonwealth, and after Władysław’s death he encouraged first Tsar Aleksei 
and then Prince Gyorgy II Rakoczi to seek election to the Polish throne, hoping 
to obtain from them guarantee of the Hetmanate’s status as a new federate of 
the Commonwealth.46 Recent work by Natalia Iakovenko suggests that cossack 
hopes of negotiating reconciliation with Poland on the basis of crown recognition 
of their “knightly” entitlements to gentry status within the Commonwealth were 
for a long time in earnest and cossack commitment to Orthodox separatism and 
Ukrainian nationalism not as ironclad as most traditional Ukrainian historiography 
has insisted.47 The failure of Adam Kysil’s negotiations and the intransigence 
of the Sejm and the new king Jan Kazimierz ended Khmel´nyts´kyi’s hopes of 
negotiating Ukrainian autonomy within the Commonwealth, but the project did not 
die altogether, for Hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi would revive it in 1659.
Other models of political union were provided by the Danubian hospodarates 
(Moldavia, Wallachia) in tributary obligation or vassalage to the Ottoman sultans. 
While Ottoman understandings of shar´ia did not permit the signing of permanent 
peace treaties with infidel polities in the Dar al-harb, it was permitted the sultan to 
46. Taras Chukhlib, “Kontsepsiia polivasalitetnoi pidlegosti B. Khmel´nyts´kogo ta ukrainsko-
rosiis´ki vzaemovidnosini seredini XVII st.” [The concept of semi-vassalage advanced by 
B. Khmel´nyts´kyi and Ukrainian-Russian relations in the middle of XVIIth century], in Smolii, 
Gorobets´, eds., Ukraina ta Ross´iia, 149-152. Virnist´ piddanstva nashogo z virnoiu ritsars´koiu 
sluzhboiu: our faithful subjection and faithful knight service.
47. S. Plokhy, “Imagining Early Modern Ukraine: The ‘Parallel World’ of Natalia Iakovenko,” 
Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 25, 3-4 (2001), 268, 271-272, 275-276.
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issue personal acts from his chancellery (ahdname) allowing infidel rulers to purchase 
temporary and conditional peace from him in exchange for tribute and thereby move 
their polities into the Dar al-sulk. Such tributary polities were left considerable 
internal political autonomy and had some freedom in conducting their own foreign 
relations, but to remain under protection they had to continue tribute payments and 
keep up cooperative behavior, and Ottoman willingness to continue protection hinged 
upon the shifting strategic interests of the sultan and generally had to be renewed 
by personal decree of each new sultan. Over time the ahdname edicts of successive 
sultans tended to expand obligations and transform tributary status into more 
dependent vassal status. Vassalage, confirmed by hattisherif edict from the sultan, 
marked incorporation of the dependent polity into the Dar al-islam: tribute payment 
was replaced by payment of the annual kharaj tax; freedom to conduct an independent 
foreign policy was reduced, and the dependent polity had to contribute forces for the 
sultan’s campaigns; the vassal ruler had to send a kinsman to the sultan’s court as 
political hostage; the election of every new vassal ruler had to be confirmed by the 
sultan; the vassal ruler also had to accept the attachment to his own administration of 
Ottoman “protector” officials. Moldavia and Wallachia had already been converted 
into vassal states by the mid-sixteenth century, in part by uncooperative conduct 
provoking Ottoman disciplinary action and in part by Ottoman manipulation of 
factional conflicts within their boyar aristocracies. In practice some Danubian vassal 
hospodars continued to conduct their own foreign policy and send envoys to states 
within the Dar al-harb, but they could be dethroned for it if the sultan so chose.48
Sultan Mehmet IV appears to have agreed to place the Zaporozhian Host under 
his protection in 1653 when Khmel´nyts´kyi received special regalia from envoy 
Mehmet Aga and instructions for administering an oath of allegiance among the 
Zaporozhian Host. But there was not enough consensus among Khmel´nyts´kyi’s 
colonels to allow a rada to ratify the agreement, and the terms remaining under 
negotiation do not permit conclusion as to whether Ottoman protectorate would 
have resulted in tributary status for the Hetmanate, vassalage, or something sui 
generis the sultan was willing to allow to exploit the unusual strategic opportunity 
the new Hetmanate presented. Even the points of Ukrainian tribute and Ukrainian 
non-interference in Moldavian affairs were unresolved. This may have encouraged 
Khmel´nyts´kyi to think he could negotiate an effective military alliance without 
having to place the Hetmanate under the same terms of vassalage as imposed on the 
Danubian principalities. On the other hand he would have had to consider that under 
Ottoman practice loose tributary relations tended to give way to tighter vassalage. 
By mid-1653 he appears to have concluded that accepting the sultan’s protectorate 
would not actually guarantee significant Ottoman military assistance against the 
Commonwealth (although the sultan had at one point offered 100,000 troops) or 
Ottoman pressure to keep the Khanate in alliance with him — either because the 
48. L.E. Semenova, Kniazhestva Valakhiia i Moldaviia konets XIV-nachalo XIX v. Ocherki 
vneshnepoliticheskoi istorii [The Wallachian and Moldavian principalities from the end of XIVth 
to the beginning of XIXth century] (M.: Indrik, 2006), 53-57, 90, 101, 128, 143-146, 152.
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sultan was not in earnest or because the khan saw establishment of an Ottoman-
protected Ukrainian tributary/vassal state as a threat to his own hegemony on the 
Pontic steppe.49 
This left the option of negotiating some form of political union — preferably 
federative and maximizing the Hetmanate’s autonomy — with a power other than 
the Commonwealth or the Porte.
But the federation of Poland and Lithuania had been accomplished under very 
different political circumstances, prepared by centuries of dynastic union and 
uncomplicated by recent major civil war. Preserving Ukrainian autonomy through 
federation with some other power with which there had been no previous political 
association — Sweden, for example, or Muscovy — was bound to be more difficult. 
This is illustrated in the 1655 efforts of Janusz Radziwiłł to negotiate federative 
protectorate with Sweden.
The articles Janusz and Bogusław Radziwiłł submitted to Magnus de la Gardie 
at Riga on 28 July 1655 offered to place Lithuania under the authority of King 
Karl X Gustav and award him and his successors the Title of Grand Duke; but they 
rejected the Swedish-proffered formula “Lithuania under the rule of the Swedish 
King” and substituted “Lithuania under the protection of the Swedish King.” They 
agreed to place the Lithuanian army under the command of Swedish generals but 
Karl X Gustav must acknowledge the Radziwiłłs as Princes of the Holy Roman 
Empire exercising leadership over Lithuanian political institutions.
De la Gardie responded with a Swedish bill of Conditions on 10 August that 
pledged protection of the rights, liberties, and status of the Lithuanians, but only to 
those signing and adhering to the treaty of protectorate and swearing to recognize 
the Swedish King and his successors as Grand Dukes of Lithuania and rightful 
owners of all royal estates of the previous Kings and Grand Dukes of Lithuania; 
those Lithuanians rejecting the treaty articles were declared to be enemies of the 
Patria and their estates and property were to be confiscated. The Lithuanian army 
was to join the Swedish army and Lithuanians were to finance and provision the 
Swedish army while it was based on Lithuanian soil.
The Swedish Conditions underwent revision at the hands of the Radziwiłł 
party. At Kedainai on 17 August 550 Lithuanian nobles, most of them Protestants 
and clients of the Radziwiłłs, signed twelve Articles of Declaration stipulating 
that Lithuania was to come under the authority of the Swedish king but with 
“guarantees that the Grand Duchy of Lithuania shall not be incorporated within 
the Kingdom of Sweden, but instead will be combined on the same terms as it has 
hitherto been united with the Kingdom of Poland, Nation with Nation, Senate with 
Senate, Nobility with Nobility will have equality in everything. Both nations shall 
preserve their own rights, statutes, and traditions.”50 The Articles of Declaration 
49. Stepankov, “Problema viboru,” 27-33.
50. Andrej Kotljarchuk, In the Shadow of Poland and Russia: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania 
and Sweden in the European Crisis of the Mid-seventeenth Century (Sodertorn: Sodertorns 
hogskola, 2006), 98-103, 104.
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further stipulated that Sweden could not require Lithuanian forces to wage war 
against Poland but Swedish forces were obligated to wage war against Muscovy 
and Ukrainian cossack raiders in order to recover all the Lithuanian territory along 
the Dnepr lost to these enemies.
Within a month de la Gardie and Bengt Skytte (Swedish viceroy in Livonia) 
had counseled the king to reject the 17 August Articles on the grounds it was not in 
Sweden’s interest to accept Lithuania in federation as an equal partner, acquiesce to 
Lithuanian neutrality in Sweden’s war with Poland, or risk Swedish forces in open 
war with Muscovy. A Lithuanian army confederatio organized against Radziwiłł by 
the Pac clan (to force return to negotiations with the Polish king) greatly weakened 
the Radziwiłłs’ position, as did the submissions to the Swedes of Paweł Sapieha and 
the Duke of Courland. The treaty that was finally ratified at Kedainai on 23 October 
was therefore one that had been revised to maximize Swedish advantage. It omitted 
Sweden’s obligation to wage war on Muscovy yet bound Lithuania to campaign 
against Poland. The king of Sweden had the right to use both the Lithuanian army 
and gentry levy at his discretion; the title of Grand Duke was now hereditary within 
the Swedish royal house and could no longer be bestowed by election; as the royal 
residence was now outside Lithuanian territory, direct administration of Lithuania 
was to be in the hands of de la Gardie as royal Governor-General at Riga, assisted by 
an Advisory Council headed by Skytte.51 By March 1656 the Kedainai Treaty was 
a dead letter, however. Lithuanian Samogitia (where three-quarters of the Swedish 
troops were quartered) rose in revolt. In August the Muscovites placed Riga under 
siege, and in November the Commonwealth and Muscovy signed at Niemiez an 
anti-Swedish security pact.
The failure of Radziwiłł’s project for obtaining Swedish protectorate reflected the 
extremity of Lithuania’s position by 1655: it failed in its aim of saving Lithuania 
from the advancing Muscovites by bringing more Swedish troops onto Lithuanian 
soil because Sweden at the time had no strategic interest in risking direct conflict with 
Muscovy; meanwhile the fact that the Swedes had already established a significant 
Swedish military presence in Lithuanian Samogitia reduced Radziwiłł’s ability to 
bargain for greater Lithuanian political autonomy within federation with Sweden. 
Khmel´nyts´kyi faced a similar problem in choosing a Muscovite protectorate in 
1653. Tsar Aleksei was finally willing to accept the responsibility of protectorate 
over the Hetmanate because it offered him Ukrainian alliance in his operations 
against the Commonwealth, on Lithuanian territory; but the tsar’s reluctance 
to station significant Muscovite forces on the territory of the Hetmanate left the 
Hetmanate vulnerable to the Tatar attacks the Hetmanate’s alliance with Muscovy 
was bound to provoke. The more Muscovite troops subsequently required in the 
Hetmanate to help protect it from the Tatars and the Poles, the more likely the 
tsar would insist on reductions in the Hetmanate’s autonomy in recompense. And 
the lack of precision and stability in the past Ukrainian-Muscovite discourse about 
protectorate gave the Muscovites great latitude to redefine the terms of protection 
51. Ibid., 118-122, 125-126, 135-137.
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to their advantage. The Muscovites were eventually likely to exploit this latitude 
because the concept of federation of equal sovereign powers was more alien to their 
political tradition than to that of Poland-Lithuania. “In a patrimonial state in which 
the tsar’s authority was theoretically unlimited and everyone was his servant, if 
not his slave, there was no place for territorial privilege, corporate rights of social 
groups, Magdeburg Law, or the Lithuanian Statute — all elements essential to 
Ukrainian rights and liberties.”52 
But efforts to chip away at Ukrainian autonomy were not at the top of envoy 
Buturlin’s original agendum at Pereiaslav, judging from his written instructions; he 
did take some first steps towards it, probably not as his own improvisation, but as 
a switch to an alternative agendum prompted by his reading of the relations among 
Khmel´nyts´kyi and his colonels and of the mood in the Ukrainian settlements he had 
encountered along his journey. Serhii Plokhy believes this alternative negotiating 
agendum had been delivered to him only in December 1653 when he had already 
arrived in Ukraine. Plokhy discerns a shift in Buturlin’s rhetoric on protectorate 
between his first and second addresses to the Pereiaslav rada on 8 January 1654. In 
the first address Buturlin employed the understanding of protectorate reflected in the 
verdict of the tsar’s Assembly of the Realm on October 1: that the tsar recognized the 
Ukrainians had the right to repudiate the authority of King Jan Kazimierz, because he 
had violated their religious rights; that the Moscow tsar, as protector of the Orthodox 
faith, had decided to take Ukraine under his protective hand in order to reestablish 
the rights of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine; and that in accepting his protection 
the Ukrainians were acknowledging themselves subjects (poddanye) of the tsar. In 
this first address Buturlin made no claims about the dynastic rights of the tsar over 
the lands of Ukrainian Rus´, and his characterization of protectorate was cast in 
religious terms, as protection of fellow Orthodox against religious persécution — the 
persecution they had already incurred from the Polish king, and the persecution they 
were likely to experience if they vassalized themselves to the Ottoman sultan.53 
Following this address Buturlin asked for the oath of allegiance from the 
hetman and his colonels. But Khmel´nyts´kyi and his starshyna asked that Buturlin 
reciprocate by pledging on the tsar’s behalf (uchiniti vera za gosudaria) that the tsar 
would not betray them to the Polish king, would stand firm for them, and preserve 
their liberties and estate privileges (pol´skomu koroliu ne vydavat´, a za nikh stoiat´, 
i vol´nostei ne narushet, i khto byl´ shliakhtich, ili kazaki i meshchianin i khto b 
kakom chinu napered sevo i kakie maetnosti u sebia imel, i tomy b vsemu byt´ 
poprezhnemu). Buturlin responded that he could not do this, as he was a subject of 
the Sovereign, serving the Sovereign; subjects of the Polish king might give oaths 
pledging their king’s fidelity, but Polish kings were neither autocrats nor Orthodox 
believers. Buturlin characterized the cossacks’ request as unseemly (nepristoinoe 
delo). The colonels answered that they and the hetman understood this but the rank-
52. Zenon E. Kohut, Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the 
Hetmanate, 1760s-1830s (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1988), 66-67.
53. Plokhy, “Krila protektsii,” 3 ; VUR, n° 205, p. 462-464.
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and-file cossacks would not and would demand an oath from Buturlin. Buturlin 
responded that if the tsar was to take them under the protection for which they 
had petitioned they must restrain ignorant people from such unseemly remarks and 
administer an oath of allegiance to the entire Zaporozhian Host.54 
When the colonels returned, accompanied by Khmel´nyts´kyi and Vyhovskyi, 
they gave their oath that they and their lands and towns would remain under the 
Sovereign’s lofty hand forever (naveki neotstupnym). Then they heard Buturlin 
deliver a second address that employed quite different rhetoric from Buturlin’s first; 
Plokhy even sees it as representing a sharp departure in spirit from the Muscovite 
diplomatic protocols of the period. The rhetoric in this second address invoked 
historical arguments for the tsar’s dynastic right of sovereignty over Ukraine on 
the basis of the legacy of St. Vladimir’s authority, the status of Kiev as traditional 
“capital” of Rus´ princes and tsars, and the principle of the unity of Rus´. The 
tsar’s protection was likened to the protective shroud of the Virgin Mary and to 
the double-headed eagle on the tsar’s seal, spreading its sheltering wings over the 
fledgling in its nest (rhetoric closely resembling that used by Epifanii Slavinetskii, 
Arsenii Satanovskii, and other Ukrainian churchmen present in Moscow since 
1649). Buturlin then invested Khmel´nyts´kyi with regalia brought from Moscow 
(banner, mace, cap, and vestment), declaring them symbols of the Sovereign’s 
“permanent and unshakeable” bounty and commitment to “protect all Orthodox 
under his illustrious tsarist rule (pod ego predsvetliuiu tsarskuiu derzhavu).”55 
This new formulation of protectorate was rhetorically more elaborate but still 
unclear in its political ramifications. The regalia presented to Khmel´nyts´kyi seemed 
to represent the tsar’s acceptance of the hetman as his personal vassal; in this sense the 
relationship being cemented resembled the Ottoman model of tributary protectorate. 
But Buturlin’s insistences on acknowledging the rule (derzhava) of an autocratic 
tsar who could not be bound in oath to his subjects and administering an oath of 
allegiance to the entire Zaporozhian Host (a condition that Moscow would not be 
able to impose on the Don Cossack Host until 1671) could be interpreted as requiring 
more, recognition that the Hetmanate was under the rule of the Moscow tsar. 
There are three possible explanations for Buturlin’s revision of protectorate 
terms at this point in the Pereiaslav ceremonies. If one were still inclined to adhere 
to the view presented in the 1954 Theses, Buturlin was merely articulating the 
project of reunification, a project that was historically natural and inevitable and 
long-held, the product of decades of Ukrainian as well as Muscovite consensual 
discourse about the natural unity of Rus´. Or one may follow the example of much 
Ukrainian historiography and consider Buturlin demanding submission to the tsar 
54. VUR, n° 205, p. 464-465. “Pol´skomu koroliu ne vydavat´, a za nikh stoiat´, i vol´nostei ne 
narushet, i khto byl´ shliakhtich, ili kazaki i meshchianin i khto b kakom chinu napered sevo i 
kakie maetnosti u sebia imel, i tomy b vsemu byt poprezhnemu” [Not to betray them to the king 
of Poland, to protect them without fail, to observe their freedoms, and that whoever used to be 
a nobleman or a cossack or a burgess or of any other condition, should keep his status and the 
possessions he might have, and to preserve everytinhg as it was].
55. VUR, n° 205, p. 467-468; Plokhy, “Krila protektsii,” 3-6.
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on terms betraying the Ukrainian national idea under articulation since the 1620s; 
from this perspective Buturlin was exploiting the Hetmanate’s strategic weakness at 
that historical moment to “spring” upon the rada a demarche extorting the surrender 
of Ukrainian independence in exchange for Muscovite military assistance. The 
third possibility — the point of view this article is attempting to argue — would see 
Moscow as approaching the Pereiaslav talks still without a clear and firm agenda 
regarding the future political relationship of the Hetmanate to the tsar’s domains 
because the tsar remained preoccupied with his project of recovering Smolensk and 
wresting Belarus´ from Lithuania and interested in the Hetmanate largely as an ally 
in achieving that project. But when Khmel´nyts´kyi and his colonels asked Buturlin 
to give an oath on behalf of the tsar affirming that he would stand firm for them 
and not betray them to the Polish king, they were considered to be expecting more 
quid pro quo than the tsar was prepared to offer at the time — he was not prepared 
to commit major forces to the defense of the territory of the Hetmanate — and so 
Buturlin had to make clear to them the tsar did not acknowledge protectorate as a 
union of fully sovereign equals.
The Pereiaslav negotiations did not clarify and “settle” the differences between 
Ukrainian and Muscovite understandings of protectorate, and the vagueness of the 
agreement emerging from Pereiaslav actually encouraged both sides to subsequently 
revise terms of protectorate unilaterally and unofficially according to political and 
military advantage. Pereiaslav did not even produce a treaty in the formal sense. The 
protocols of the Pereiaslav “agreement” preserved in the Ambassadors’ Chancellery at 
Moscow are limited to envoy Buturlin’s report to Moscow, the Muscovite translation 
of Khmel´nyts´kyi’s proposed terms — the 23 “Articles of Petition” delivered to 
Moscow on 12 March — and the responding “March Articles” issued by the tsar 
later in the month and delivered to Khmel´nyts´kyi by Bohdanovich-Zarudnyi and 
Pavlo Teteria.56 The original of Khmel´nyts´kyi’s Articles of Petition has not been 
preserved, nor is there a final and binding copy of a treaty, leading many historians 
to argue that the original text of the Articles of Petition was suppressed and even 
the tsar’s original March Articles removed and these articles doctored in 1659 by 
Kiev voevoda A.N. Trubetskoi in order to revise terms of union to Muscovy’s 
advantage.57 Khmel´nyts´kyi’s Articles of Petition expected the tsar to recognize the 
Ukrainian hetman’s right to continue conducting his own foreign policy, with the sole 
qualification that the hetman would keep the tsar informed of major developments; but 
the tsar’s March Articles responded that the hetman did not have the right to treat with 
the Polish king or Ottoman sultan without the tsar’s permission. Khmel´nyts´kyi’s 
Articles of Petition tried to restrict Muscovite voevody and garrisons to Kiev and 
Chernigov and stipulated that the voevody were not to interfere in civil and judicial 
administration in those towns, except perhaps to offer hearings on appeal; the tsar’s 
March Articles confirmed the Ukrainian towns’ right to elected self-government 
56. VUR, n° 205, p. 423-490; AJuZR 10, n° 8, xi, p. 445-452 and VUR, n° 245, p. 560-565; 
VUR, n° 248, p. 567-570.
57. Basarab, Pereiaslav 1654, 25-41.
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under Magdeburg law but did not explicitly affirm any limit to the number of voevody 
the tsar could station in Ukrainian towns nor any limitation on their authority.
The real cause of subsequent Ukrainian disillusionment with Muscovite 
protectorate had less to do with the contents of the Pereiaslav agreement than with 
military developments occurring after Pereiaslav. Khmel´nyts´kyi and his colonels 
had calculated in mid-1653 that embracing Moscow would save them from a 
two-front war, against the Tatars as well as the Poles. But the tsar’s protectorate 
came too late to achieve this; by mid-December 1653 Poles and Tatars were in 
alliance, and by October 1654 they were on the offensive against the hetman. 
Likewise, Tsar Aleksei’s decision to take the Hetmanate under his protection and 
abandon the Polianovka armistice was based on miscalculations: that Lithuanian 
Belarus´ could be quickly seized and held and that this would give the Muscovite-
Ukrainian alliance such military preponderance King Jan Kazimierz would have to 
abandon attempts to reconquer Ukraine; and that report of the Pereiaslav alliance 
would alarm the sultan and the Crimean khan but they would be induced to resign 
themselves to it, that Khmel´nyts´kyi and Vyhovskyi would have the diplomatic 
skill to hold the khan in alliance or at least secure his neutrality.
The next five years of war against Poland-Lithuanian and the Crimean 
Khanate would give Moscow reason to further reduce the de facto autonomy of 
the Hetmanate. Muscovite garrisons and voevody would be established in other 
Ukrainian towns and Muscovite taxes and levies introduced for their maintenance. 
The perceived imperatives of voevoda military administration would increasingly 
conflict with the traditional liberties of these towns. Khmel´nyts´kyi’s expectations 
that Chernigov and southern Belarus´ would be united with the Hetmanate rather 
than with the tsar’s domains would be frustrated. Khmel´nyts´kyi never treated the 
Pereiaslav Agreement as limiting his freedom of action in the diplomatic sphere, for 
he continued to deal with Sweden even while the tsar was at war with Sweden (just 
as the Moldavian hospodars had dealt with Poland and other powers despite their 
tributary subjection to the sultan). This enraged the tsar, but as his threats were not 
enough to distrain Khmel´nyts´kyi, the tsar punished the Hetmanate by excluding 
its representatives from the talks at Vilnius in 1656 and suddenly signing armistice 
with the Poles in order to redirect the Muscovite army against the Swedes. 
These developments brought Ukrainian and Muscovite leaders to view 
their opposite numbers as irredeemably perfidious. They divided the Ukrainian 
population, estranged part of the cossack starshyna and rank-and-file from Moscow 
and eventually drove hetman Ivan Vyhovskyi to restore alliance with the Crimean 
Tatars and seek reunion with the Commonwealth and the expulsion of Muscovite 
troops from the Ukraine.
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